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PARTIES, VOTERS AND POLICY
PRIORITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS,
1971–2002
Paul Pennings
A B S T R A C T
To what extent are the priorities of voters reflected by the policy pledges
of parties? And how decisive are party pledges for the policy-making of
governments? The chain of delegation assumes direct linkages between
voters, parties and governments, of which the voters are the principal
actor. When this assumption is tested for The Netherlands, it turns out
that parties are not very responsive to voter priorities and that the policy
distances between parliamentary parties and governments are relatively
small. This pattern makes sense in a consensus democracy in which
parties have to compromise and cannot afford simply to reflect what
voters perceive as important. It also suggests that the mandate theory is
more directly applicable to majoritarian democracies, where the winner
takes all and therefore has more scope to translate voter priorities into
policy-making.
KEY WORDS  government declarations  party pledges  voter priorities
The relationships between the preferences and priorities of voters, parties
and governments are crucial to the functioning of parliamentary democ-
racies. Together, these relationships form a ‘chain of delegation’ from
voters to parties and from parties to policy-makers (Strøm, 2000). This
article seeks to unravel the connection between the priorities of voters,
parties and governments in order to clarify how the chain of delegation
works in the Dutch context. The article is limited to policy priorities,
because these are vital to the formation of a political agenda, which is one
of the main outcomes of the chain of delegation. This agenda determines
how public resources are utilized in order to achieve prioritized collective
goals.
Strøm distinguishes four discrete steps in this chain of delegation (2000:
267):
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1. From voters to representatives.
2. From legislators to the executive branch.
3. From the head of government to the heads of different executive depart-
ments.
4. From the heads of different executive departments to civil servants.
I concentrate on the first two steps, which determine the ‘democraticness’
of the chain of delegation (Keman, 2002). The first concerns the relation-
ship between the priorities of voters and parties. This relationship is indica-
tive of the degree of party responsiveness: the way in which political parties
translate problems and voter priorities into programmes and, when in
government, translate these emphases into decision-making (Pennings,
1998). In the literature, two opposing interpretations of this relationship
can be found: the Downsian one and the saliency theory.
The Downsian model of party competition assumes that parties are
merely vote-seekers and hence not ideologically fixed. Whereas party
responsiveness is high according to Downs, it is low according to the
saliency theory. The saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie,
1983) claims that parties try to render selective emphases by devoting most
attention to the types of issue which favour themselves and give corre-
spondingly less attention to issues that favour their opponents. Conse-
quently, party competition is only secondarily a direct confrontation of
opposing policies (Budge, 1992, 1993; Budge and Farlie, 1983: 23–4).
Parties do not blindly reflect what voters want and normally they do not
argue with their opponents. Instead, they emphasize issues that fit within
their ideological profile. This does not mean that there is no overlap between
manifestos. Parties do address the same topics, but often prefer to present
their own position and not to criticize other parties’ positions. This is
reflected by the relatively high number of positive statements compared to
negative statements in party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001). This is also in
line with the saliency theory, which assumes that parties will stress their
own position and consequently will not discuss the positions of their
competitors at length.
The second step in the chain of delegation concerns the relationship
between the priorities of parties and governments. This theme is at the heart
of the mandate theory according to which the competing parties offer the
voters different programmes from which to choose. The governing parties
are therefore bound to carry through the programmes on which they have
been elected (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990: 111; Klingemann et al., 1994).
The mandate theory on democracy differs from other theories in empha-
sizing that the policy positions put forward by the parties at elections are
crucial for voters in determining their party choice. By selectively empha-
sizing issues, parties aim at attracting a net inflow of voters (Budge and
Hofferbert, 1990). This correspondence between voter priorities and party
priorities is essential for the ‘democraticness’ of the political process. A high
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degree of correspondence between party priorities and government policies
as such does not make the chain of delegation democratic, since all depends
on whether the party emphases are derived from voter emphases or not.
This article is therefore focused on the crucial question: to what degree do
parties reflect the policy priorities of voters?
Hypotheses on the Dutch Case
Since the interactions between parties, voters and governments are struc-
tured by the national institutional context, it is not possible to give a general
answer to this question. For this reason, the analysis is limited to one
country, so that the findings can be interpreted within a specific political-
institutional context. This prevents too broad generalizations on relation-
ships between the policy agendas of voters, parties and governments which
are always bound to a particular time and place. The Dutch case is chosen
for two reasons. First, The Netherlands forms a sharp contrast with two-
party systems which are often chosen in order to illustrate that the assump-
tions of the mandate theory are correct. But to what extent are they correct
for a multiparty system with coalition governments, which are so predomi-
nant in Europe? Second, the Dutch case is well documented with compara-
tive data on the policy positions of the main political actors through time.
Included in the analysis are all parties that have participated in government
before 2002. These are the Christian Democrats (the CDA and its prede-
cessor KVP), the progressive liberals (D66), the social democrats (PvdA),
the conservative liberals (VVD) and the Green Left (GRL).1
The applicability of the mandate theory to the Dutch case has recently
been studied by Robert Thomson (1999), who compares the degree of
pledge fulfilment in The Netherlands (1986–98) with the United Kingdom.
He finds that in the Dutch context 61 percent of the pledges on socio-
economic topics made by parties in government are fulfilled, whereas in the
UK this average is 70 percent. Yet, it would be too early too conclude, given
this moderate to high degree of pledge fulfilment, that the mandate theory
is fully applicable to The Netherlands. There are two reasons for this. First,
the mandate theory assumes that the party emphases do reflect the priorities
of voters. This connection is not empirically examined in Thomson’s
research. It is simply assumed that voters recognize party pledges as being
relevant to their own concerns. This assumption is questionable since, as
this article demonstrates, there is no systematic and close association
between the preferences of Dutch parties and voters.
Second, pledge fulfilment is mainly a concern of cabinet parties, but which
parties get into government is not a direct reflection of the outcome of Dutch
elections. Which government is formed depends on a variety of factors, and
voter preferences are only one of them (De Vries, 1999; Narud, 1996).
Hence, the politics of coalition formation hinders the applicability of the
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mandate model to The Netherlands or any other consensus democracy. If
party pledges are weakly linked to voter preferences, and if the participation
in government is vaguely connected to the election results, then the mandate
model does not fully apply, even if all party pledges are fulfilled.
The need for coalition-building and compromise in The Netherlands
implies that parties cannot translate their own policy preferences directly
into policy-making. For this reason it is expected that public policy-making
is not a direct reflection of the priorities of governing parties and voters.
Although not perfect, there is likely to be some connection between the
priorities of voters, parties and governments, because otherwise democratic
decision-making would be inconceivable and the chain of delegation would
not even exist.
Data and Methodology
The priorities of voters are estimated on the basis of one question that is
asked in all Dutch parliamentary election studies: ‘What do you consider to
be the most important problems in our country?’ (Van Deth and Horstman,
1989). The answers are coded into categories that capture all main policy
domains in Dutch politics.2 The multiple response answers to the ‘most
important problem question’ are taken by counting the percentages across
five variables (problem first mentioned to problem last mentioned). This
way of counting is appropriate because the order of the problem seems unre-
lated to importance as evaluated to the respondent (Schumann and Presser,
1981: 88). For this reason, the number of responses gives a better impres-
sion of the overall importance of problems than just the problem mentioned
first. However, two types of objection could be made.
First, one could argue that, in the chosen procedure, respondents who
(can) name many problems get more weight in the analyses than those who
can see only one dominant problem, not to mention those who do not
spontaneously name any ‘important’ problem. This is correct, but the
number of responses per individual respondent is limited. Furthermore,
this problem would not be solved by choosing only the first problem, since
this one is not necessarily the most important problem. Second, one could
expect a bias in this question format towards national problems as opposed
to international, European or world problems. If so, the question format
could also lead to bias in estimates of the relationship between voters’
priorities and parties’ priorities. It seems, however, that this possible bias
is also limited because the question wording does not exclude references
to international problems. One category of problems, for example, is
‘common market and EU’ (Horstman and Van Deth, 1993). Not only
voters but also party manifestos will often discuss international problems
from a national perspective. However, it is correct that the national scope
of the problems put forward is more pronounced in the case of voters than
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in the case of party manifestos and government declarations. Finally, one
has to be aware that the multiple response score is highly aggregated and
does not reflect the saliency which individual voters attach to issues. All
the scores from voters, parties and governments are aggregated to the party
level. This means that the units of analysis are the five party policy
positions on all issue categories per election year, and each party score is
accompanied by the emphasis of voters and governments on the same
issues in that election year. This is in line with the chain of delegation in
which parties establish the crucial link between voter priorities and govern-
ment policies.
The priorities of political parties are derived from party manifestos and
those of governments from government declarations (Klingemann et al.,
1994; Laver and Budge, 1992). Although government declarations are
smaller documents than government agreements, their comparability is
better, since government agreements vary significantly in size whereas
government declarations do not. However, since both document types are
closely related, we do not expect a significant difference between them in
terms of emphases on policy areas (e.g. this is confirmed by the strong corre-
lations, which are 0.72 in 1994 and 0.86 in 1998).
The priorities of voters, parties and governments can only be compared
by means of identically coded issue domains. The party manifestos and
government declarations are already coded by means of the MRG coding
scheme3 (Budge et al., 1987, 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994). The problem
with these coding categories of party manifestos and government declar-
ations is that they cannot be directly matched with the priorities of voters.
In order to achieve an optimal match between the priorities of voters, parties
and governments, all relevant policy documents have been recoded by
taking the coding categories of voters as the starting point because these are
the only categories which are given and cannot be adapted by adding or
reformulating categories. The party manifestos and government declar-
ations, on the other hand, can be analysed by any coding scheme with the
help of content analysis.
For these reasons, the MRG coding scheme is not used and instead the
party manifestos and government declarations are analysed with a new
coding scheme based on the categories of the national problems mentioned
by voters. This is done by means of a computerized content analysis on the
basis of thematic word counts with the help of the computer content
analysis software TEXTPACK.4 For each category of most important national
problems, the main relevant key words are selected which cover this policy
area. The content analysis leads to a frequency distribution that reveals the
relative weight of all policy areas. Earlier content analysis on the basis of
this technique has shown that it is possible to code manifestos with word
lists and to arrive at reliable results that are comparable to or even better
than the coding done by humans (Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001; Laver
and Garry, 2000; Laver et al., 2003). The dictionary is validated by means
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of the Keyword-In-Context technique, which allows one to examine the
occurrences of key words in their textual environment. In this way the
dictionary is improved by assessing the consistency of meanings associated
with a word, word pattern or category. Once an inconsistency has been
detected the key word was removed or reformulated in order to make it fit
better.
Parties and Voter Priorities
The frequency distribution of the voter responses to the national problem
question forms a rank order of national problems that can be interpreted
as a popular agenda (Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995). It should be noted,
however, that the ranking of problems by voters is only partly comparable
with the way in which parties emphasize national problems in manifestos.
An important difference is that parties relate problems to each other and
incorporate them within a comprehensive agenda, whereas voters just
mention one to five separate problems that seem important to them at that
particular moment in time. Whereas parties are bounded by their own
promises, voters are not bounded in any way. Obviously, the popular
agenda has a different status from the agenda of parties and governments,
but it is still highly relevant because it cannot be ignored without jeopar-
dizing the democraticness of political decision-making. Table 1 gives an
overview of the policy priorities of voters between 1971 and 2002. In all
the tables presented here, the national problems are aggregated into 15
categories in order to keep the tables as compact as possible without leaving
out important policy areas.
Table 1 indicates that several issues appear to be periodically highly
salient in The Netherlands, such as unemployment, environmental pollu-
tion, housing and ethnic minorities. Others have consistently low scores
(like culture) or most of the time relatively high scores (like foreign affairs).
Most striking are the fluctuations in the popular perceptions of problems.
Downs (1972) interpreted these as ‘issue-attention cycles’, in which
problems come and go partly as a consequence of the attention given by the
media to the problem. However, Downs illustrated this cycle solely for
pollution and did not link it to the real world problem intensity. However,
since a large range of policy domains is under study, it is interesting to deter-
mine the extent to which the cyclical character of issue attention is also
relevant for other policy areas. This seems to be the case. Not only was there
a sudden rise (and fall) of attention for pollution (1971 and 1989), but also
in the case of housing shortage (1971 and 1972), unemployment (starting
with the oil crisis in 1973 and ending towards the end of the 1980s) 
and inflation (1972). In most instances, the alarmed discovery and euphoric
enthusiasm are followed by a gradual decline from intense public interest.
Owing to the cyclical character of public attention, euphoric public 
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enthusiasm is assumed to have only moderate long-term effects on policy-
making (Aarts et al., 1992).
How responsive are parties to the popular perceptions of the saliency of
problems? If parties are vote maximizers, parties are seeking to be situated
as closely as possible to major concentrations of voters. This Downsian
notion of party competition is contested by the saliency theory, which claims
that parties tend to stress mainly those issues that fit within their own
ideology. This partisan rigidity makes it unlikely that parties are blindly
responsive to popular perceptions. The saliency theory predicts that parties
will normally stick to issues which fit within their ideological profile (Budge,
1993: 94–5).
In order to examine the degrees to which parties respond to voter
priorities, the latter are subtracted from the party emphases on issues in the
party manifestos (and referred to hereafter as ‘distance scores’). The gener-
ally high distance scores in Table 2 demonstrate that the partisan agendas
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Table 1. Priorities of Dutch voters (means)
1971 1972 1977 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002
Agriculture, 
economy 4.1 3.0 7.2 19.0 11.8 4.8 6.0 5.5 0.8
Culture 3.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 5.7
Democracy, 
emancipation 5.6 10.1 4.4 6.4 6.7 6.5 9.8 8.5 4.0
Education 1.4 1.8 1.2 0.5 1.8 3.2 1.0 3.9 9.3
Foreign 
relations 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.0
Housing 
shortage 19.8 12.8 7.2 3.2 0.9 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.1
Law and 
order, religion 3.5 2.8 5.5 6.8 7.7 7.9 9.3 18.1 18.8
Minorities, 
racism 2.1 2.8 3.0 3.6 6.3 4.6 22.9 7.4 13.3
Pollution 21.2 16.0 5.7 2.6 3.9 30.7 6.9 6.7 3.2
Public health 3.4 1.5 6.2 1.8 7.6 7.3 3.8 15.7 15.5
Social welfare, 
subsidies 7.8 6.3 6.6 4.5 8.8 7.3 15.5 9.9 4.6
Taxes, income 
and prices 9.5 17.4 14.4 3.6 3.9 5.6 2.3 5.7 1.5
Town planning 
and traffic 9.6 9.2 4.4 0.2 0.8 2.6 3.3 9.2 9.7
Unemployment 3.1 9.9 31.0 37.2 30.5 16.6 16.1 6.1 2.8
War and peace 1.1 1.8 0.8 10.0 8.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, 1971–2002. N = 600 (9 years  15 issue
categories = 135 rows for each of five parties). The Green Left has only 60 rows since no
data are available before 1989.
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are not a direct reflection of the popular agenda. This apparent lack of
responsiveness can be seen as a result of partisan rigidity and as
confirmation of the assumptions of the saliency theory. Party rigidity
implies, per definition, a lack of responsiveness. This does not mean that
parties are totally unresponsive. In the case of the environmental issue, the
results show that there was a limited responsiveness in 1971 and 1989 (the
mean emphasis of parties was 30.7 percent –21.1 percent = 9.6 percent,
which is quite considerable for party manifestos). Yet, compared to the
absolute level of voter emphasis on this issue, the responsiveness of parties
is weak.
Fluctuations in the popular saliency of issues mostly correspond with the
real problem intensity (Van der Brug, 2000). Unemployment was indeed
highest between the early 1970s and the middle of the 1980s and the crime
rate is steadily rising, just as the increasing popular attention for this issue
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Table 2. Distances in policy priorities of parties and voters (%)
1971 1972 1977 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002
Agriculture, 
economy 10.0 –3.0 7.8 –0.9 4.2 9.9 10.2 10.2 16.2
Culture 0.7 –1.1 2.0 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.2 3.8 –2.3
Democracy, 
emancipation 0.5 –10.1 1.6 –1.7 –0.9 –0.4 –2.4 –2.1 2.5
Education 12.8 –1.8 8.7 7.5 7.6 5.1 5.3 6.4 1.9
Foreign 
relations 10.0 –0.7 9.2 10.0 10.8 11.4 12.2 8.6 5.8
Housing 
shortage –17.0 –12.8 –4.0 –0.2 1.3 0.7 –0.7 0.8 1.4
Law and 
order, religion 2.3 –2.8 0.7 –1.0 –1.4 –1.6 –2.5 –11.5 –11.8
Minorities, 
racism –1.4 –2.8 –2.4 –2.3 –4.8 –2.5 –21.1 –5.5 –11.2
Pollution –17.6 –16.0 –1.5 1.2 1.7 –21.1 1.6 0.3 4.1
Public health –0.9 –1.5 –2.3 1.0 –4.9 –4.2 –1.4 –11.8 –11.7
Social welfare,
subsidies 2.1 –6.3 4.6 5.4 0.7 2.9 –5.3 0.3 4.4
Taxes, income 
and prices –3.5 –17.4 –8.6 3.1 1.2 –1.3 3.0 –1.2 3.5
Town planning
and traffic –0.3 –9.2 3.8 7.4 7.8 5.5 4.6 –0.7 –1.0
Unemployment 3.5 –9.9 –20.9 –25.6 –20.0 –8.5 –7.2 2.5 5.7
War and peace 2.2 –1.8 2.4 –6.6 –6.4 1.6 1.4 0.8 1.1
The distance measure is computed as the difference between the emphases of political parties
minus those of voters. A positive score means that parties emphasize more; a negative score
that parties emphasize less.
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies and party manifestos, 1971–2002. N = 600.
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(Visser and Wijnhoven, 1990). But in some cases there is a large distance
between the real problem intensity and popular saliency. In these cases,
voter perceptions do not mirror real problem intensities very well or are
overreactions to these problems. This is illustrated by the issue of environ-
mental pollution. The ‘objective saliency’ of environmental pollution is
reflected by a steadily rising level of all kinds of pollution, but the ‘popular
saliency’ is not linked to these real levels of pollution, but to the degree of
media attention (e.g. in reaction to the Club of Rome in the 1970s). Another
example is the issue of minorities, in particular asylum-seekers, which
scored high as a national problem in both 1994 and 2002 when it figured
prominently in the election campaigns. Apparently, voters are mainly led by
the attention given by the media to this issue.
A comparison between parties (not shown here) indicates that the
distances do not vary much from party to party. Parties seem to stick to
their ideological profile and do not make extreme shifts in their policy
priorities, as voters seem to do from time to time. The distances also go in
the same direction, such that some issues are emphasized by all parties and
others less so. It is uncommon for parties to emphasize an issue much more
in one year and much less in another year compared to voters. Once an
issue is emphasized much more in one election year, it will be emphasized
slightly more (or less) in another year in many cases, but never much less
than voters.
As far as differences do exist they can often be explained by the ideo-
logical profile of parties. The distance of the PvdA on unemployment is
higher than that of the CDA and VVD, but in cases of law and order (includ-
ing traditional morality) it is mostly the other way around. Similarly, the
Green Left has a higher positive score on pollution and a higher negative
score on law and order, which is also in line with what one could expect on
the basis of ideological differences. All in all, Table 2 seems to confirm the
earlier hypothesis that the election results are hard to interpret as a mandate
of voters to parties because parties advocate policies which are not perceived
by voters as most important to their concerns.
What about the differences between parties and governments? In the
Dutch case, the need for cooperation between parties in coalition govern-
ments means that cabinet parties have to overcome their differences. These
parties have to make the switch from competition (during elections) to
cooperation (when in government). Consequently, the preferences of cabinet
parties during elections may change when they enter government. This insti-
tutional feature of a multiparty system is not taken into account by the
mandate theory. In order to understand how competing party policy
positions can also be the basis for cooperation in governments, it is helpful
to study party policy positions over time. The left–right scale is suited to
measure policy differences since the left–right divide still represents one of
the most fundamental cleavages in Dutch politics (Andeweg and Irwin,
2002; Pennings and Keman, 2003). The scale employed in this article is a
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revised version of the left–right scale introduced by Klingemann and others
on the basis of a factor analysis (Klingemann et al., 1994; see also Laver,
2001). This scale has been slightly adapted. Items have been removed which
do not fit very well into the scale according to a reliability analysis. A
Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.76 is acceptable, as party manifestos are not
written with the explicit aim of scaling items (Kleinnijenhuis, 1999: 93).
The scale is constructed by subtracting the sum of 12 left issues from the
sum of 11 right issues (consequently, the higher the score, the more to the
left a party is).
Figure 1 shows that since 1971 the degree of left–right polarization dimin-
ishes. This finding is confirmed in most of the literature (Krouwel, 1999;
Laver and Mair, 1999; Michels, 1993; Pennings and Keman, 2003).
Between 1986 and 2002 the policy distances between the PvdA, CDA and
VVD have become significantly smaller than in the period before. The PvdA,
in particular, made a remarkable move toward the centre. This trend is
confirmed by an analysis of the city block distances (derived from cluster
analysis) which shows that the convergence in The Netherlands is fairly
strong compared to other countries (Pennings, 2003).
In an early analysis of Dutch party manifestos, Dittrich came to the same
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38
200219981994198919861982198119771971
R
ig
ht
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Le
ft
40
20
0
-20
-40
CDA
D66
GRL
PvdA
VVD
Figure 1. Left versus right since 1971
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conclusion that there is a gradual trend toward convergence between all
parties (Dittrich, 1987: 228). According to Dittrich this can be explained
by the sole inclusion of (potential) government parties in the Manifesto
Project. Dittrich’s interpretation is not wholly satisfactory because the need
to build coalitions did not change in the post-war period. This cannot there-
fore explain why parties tend toward a more moderate stance. The shift
from polarization in the 1970s to convergence in the 1990s contradicts the
view of Arend Lijphart, in which Dutch pillarization is identified with
consensus and depillarization with conflict (Lijphart, 1968).
There are two explanations for convergence in the Dutch context. The
first focuses on external factors, in particular the combination of a growing
electoral volatility and a decline of traditional cleavages (religion, class)
which makes it risky for parties to emphasize the traditional left and right
salient issues because there is no large stable group of followers of typically
left and right issues (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002; Irwin and Van Holsteyn,
1999). Another explanation focuses on the party system dynamics. When
the PvdA follows a polarization strategy, the CDA will build a coalition with
the VVD. This in fact happened after 1977. When the VVD polarizes, the
CDA will build a coalition with the PvdA, as occurred in 1989. Polariza-
tion in the Dutch context therefore means that the chances of becoming a
governing party diminish. Consequently, the three (partly) contradictory
goals of vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking are balanced by
adapting a depolarization strategy, because this improves the prospects of
becoming a governing party (Hillebrand and Irwin, 1999). This strategy is
more visible in the movements of left parties (i.e. PvdA and Green Left) than
in those of right parties (i.e. VVD). But, generally speaking, consensus-
building has become dominant over conflict and polarization (Andeweg and
Irwin, 2002). This explains the remarkable movement of the PvdA toward
the centre of the left–right spectrum. But there is a price to pay for this shift,
i.e. the PvdA gradually loses the support of the left-oriented voters. The
intermediate position of parties in the chain of delegation implies that they
have to seek a balance between competition for votes and the prospects of
cooperation in government. Responsiveness to voter priorities is an aspect
of partisan strategic behaviour which needs to be balanced with other party
goals (Müller and Strøm, 1999).
Priorities of Parties and Governments
The mandate theory stating that the governing parties are mandated by the
voters to pursue policies is based on the assumption that it makes a differ-
ence which parties are governing parties and also that voters are able to
evaluate the outcomes of the government policies. However, the Dutch
parties have been converging, which makes it difficult for voters to distin-
guish between parties. In addition, cabinets are always based on coalitions,
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so that voters may have problems holding one particular party accountable
for the outcomes of policy-making. Consequently, it does not make much
difference for the policy outputs of governments which parties are govern-
ing, not at least as much as in the British majoritarian system. These differ-
ences between the British and the Dutch case suggest that the mandate
theory is biased by the British situation and cannot be generalized to all
parliamentary democracies.
This statement is supported in Table 3, which shows small policy
distances between parties and governments compared with the larger
distances between parties and voters. Comparative analysis shows that this
is typical of countries in which the Christian Democrats are pivotal actors
necessary to form a government (Van Kersbergen, 1995). In these countries,
the impact of individual parties on government policy is harder to discern
than in countries with a regular clear-cut alternation of government. A
perceptible impact of parties on government policy has been found in 
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Table 3. Policy distances between policy priorities of parties and governments
1971 1972 1977 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002
Agriculture,
economy –2.2 –15.3 –1.5 –1.5 –0.1 1.4 2.5 –0.2 –6.5
Culture 1.7 –1.4 1.0 1.1 2.9 1.6 0.0 2.5 2.8
Democracy,
emancipation 2.3 –6.0 2.4 0.4 –0.2 2.1 –1.1 0.7 –2.7
Education –2.6 –12.4 –2.3 –0.3 –1.8 1.0 –3.4 2.3 1.5
Foreign
relations –2.0 –13.6 1.4 1.2 –1.5 1.3 2.1 –2.9 2.2
Housing
shortage 1.2 –3.0 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.0
Law and
order, religion –4.4 –8.7 –4.4 –6.3 –6.3 –11.7 –8.7 –7.4 0.2
Minorities,
racism 0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.2 –1.2 –0.2 –0.9 –0.5 –0.7
Pollution –1.5 –3.8 –0.3 0.7 2.6 3.2 3.5 2.4 4.3
Public health 1.1 –1.9 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.1 1.3 –1.1
Social welfare,
subsidies 0.3 –7.5 1.3 0.6 2.3 0.7 1.5 1.0 –2.6
Taxes, income 
and prices 1.7 –8.4 0.1 1.2 1.1 0.0 2.9 1.9 –0.2
Town planning 
and traffic 1.8 –6.0 0.6 3.2 1.7 –2.0 1.6 0.9 5.0
Unemployment 0.6 –7.1 –2.1 –1.7 –2.0 –0.7 0.0 –2.5 –4.0
War and peace 1.8 –4.3 1.1 –1.3 0.1 0.7 –0.4 –0.6 0.7
The distance measure is computed as the difference between the emphases of political parties
and those of governments. A positive score means that parties emphasize more; a negative
score that parties emphasize less.
Source: Party manifestos and Government Declarations. N = 600.
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countries like Norway with a clear-cut alternation of government between
one bloc of parties and an alternative bloc with little or no overlapping
membership (Gallagher et al., 2000; Laver and Budge, 1992: 421–5).
It is not just the distance between the priorities of governing parties and
government declarations that is small, but also that between the opposition
parties and government declarations. Consequently, the priorities of both
incumbent parties and opposition parties are reflected in Dutch government
policies. As it is difficult to ascribe policy performance to one particular
party, one could expect that participation in government might not seem a
very important motivation for party choice. This is confirmed by the
research of Van Holsteyn, who found that between 1971 and 1998 on
average 10 percent of voters refer explicitly to the composition of previous
or future governments when accounting for their own party choice (Van
Holsteyn, 2000: 112). The small distance between the priorities of incum-
bent and opposition parties and government policies must be related to the
Dutch consociational political tradition. All established parties are poten-
tial coalition partners that might have to cooperate as coalition partners
after the elections. As stressed by Petry (1991), incumbent parties are
inclined to adopt the priorities of the opposition parties in order to make
them less attractive alternative parties to voters.
Discussion
A popular notion of democratic decision-making suggests that political
parties should pick up on the problems of the masses and formulate the
answers to these problems in programmes and policies. When parties do not
appear to be performing this task well enough, most political commentators
conclude that there is a large gap between citizens and politicians. This
notion of democracy is rather one-sighted, because it only takes into account
the input side of the political process. If parties and politicians were to react
solely to the priorities of the voters, this could lead to incoherent and ineffec-
tive policies because, owing to the issue-attention cycle, the popular prefer-
ences are not always adequate reflections of the objective problem intensity.
On the other hand, parties cannot totally ignore popular preferences.
The interaction between voters and parties is only one side of respon-
siveness and concerns the step from problems to programmes. The other
side is the degree to which the priorities of governments reflect those of
parties. This is the basic theme of mandate theory. Empirical research on
the connection of these priorities is theoretically relevant for the assump-
tions that are made by the mandate theory. The mandate theory gives us an
ideal image of democratic decision-making which is inspired by the British
system. The Dutch case shows that there are several structural barriers for
the mandatory role of parties in consensus democracies where mandates are
always shared with other parties.
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The low degree of responsiveness of parties indicates that the linkage
between voters and parties is the weakest one in the chain of delegation.
The linkage between the priorities of parties and governments is much
stronger. There should be some connection between the popular and the
political agendas in order to enable democratic decision-making, but if the
two agendas would merge, the policy agenda of governments would become
highly unstable. In the Dutch context the mandate theory does not apply in
the same manner as in Britain because Dutch parties are not in a position
to make a direct translation of voter priorities or their own priorities into
policy-making since they have to compromise. 
Notes
1 The Green Left was never in government, but the PPR, which is one of the
constituent parties, participated in the cabinet of Den Uyl (1973–77). For an intro-
duction to Dutch parties and politics, see Andeweg and Irwin (2002).
2 The main categories (apart from subcategories) are agricultural policy, taxes,
foreign relations, culture and recreation, defence, democratization, economic and
financial problems, energy problems, ethical problems, law and order, income and
prices, squatting, social work, environmental problems, minorities, education and
science, political problems, religious problems, town and country planning, social
welfare, government subsidies, traffic, welfare state, public health, women’s
emancipation, employment, housing shortage and riot-police behaviour (for the
full coding list, see Appendix 1 in Van der Eijk et al., 1981). In all tables these
categories are aggregated into 15 categories in order to improve readability.
3 This coding scheme was developed in 1979 by the Manifesto Research Group
(MRG) of the European Consortium for Political Research. This coding scheme
comprises 56 categories which are divided into 7 domains. On the basis of
frequencies (counts as a proportion of the whole document), percentage scores
have been obtained for 300 parties in 25 countries. The coding scheme is published
in Budge et al. (2001: 222–8).
4 TEXTPACK offers some standard tools for content analysis and can categorize text
according to content analytic dictionaries. The numeric output holds frequencies
of categories. However, the choice to use TEXTPACK is arbitrary, since many other
programs can do the same, e.g. TEXTQUEST, VBPRO and Wordstat. For an
overview of content analysis software, see: www.car.ua.edu.
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